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THE NEW WORLD ORDER: ENDURING CURRENTS IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

by

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THE NEW WORLD ORDER: ENDURING CURRENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

The primary focus of this thesis is an attempt to show that President Bush's New World Order reflects enduring currents in U.S. foreign policy. This assessment is undertaken through delineating, examining and evaluating three major "schools" of thought which have influenced American foreign policy. The three "schools" are isolationism, realism and idealism. The assessment of these schools of thought is based on an examination of critical writings of leading architects, practitioners and specialists of American foreign policy. The thesis seeks to suggest that these schools are constantly interacting in American politics, and constantly seeking to capture the dynamic of American foreign policy. Thus, the major objective of the thesis is to delineate these schools, indicating their impact on particular American policies and relating them to the evolution of American thought to date as expressed in the ideals of the New World Order.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The foundation of the United States was built upon the principle of "We the People." President Lincoln stood on a battlefield and stated: "This nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."¹ President Bush has recently reiterated this principle when he said: "Since the birth of our nation, 'We the People,' has been the source of our strength. What government can do alone is limited, but the potential of the American people knows no limits."² "We the People," is more than a motto, it is a foundation for American foreign policy.

Every presidential administration, from Washington to Bush, has had different views on how to handle foreign policy. However, one underlining theme has been constant under many presidents since 1860: universal human rights and how to represent that policy to the world. To Americans, democracy and freedom are something that should be shared by every country. Irving Kristol stated: "Those who make American foreign policy will discover--that any viable conception of the United States's 'national interest' cannot help but be organically related to that public philosophy--ideology, which

¹ Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin, ed., Speeches of the American Presidents (The H.W. Wilson, Company, New York, 1988), 193.

² George Bush, "State of the Union," Vital Speeches of the Day 57, 9, (February 15, 1991): 259.

is the basis of what we have come to call 'the American way of life.'"³

While fighting for democracy, "we need only continue doing what we have done since the beginning."⁴ President Bush stated at Aspen, Colorado that he needed; "A policy . . . every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War."⁵ But we cannot foresee the exact form of the new global politics or the new problems heading in our directions. "Rather than withdraw into ourselves, we ought to press ahead with what has brought us this success--the advancement of the democratic idea. First, America is a great force for good in the world. Second, what is good for democracy is good for America."⁶

A "foreign policy is the face a nation wears to the world."⁷ Besides, "the American people are entitled to a foreign policy that seeks to preserve and increase their living standards, and to one that contributes to their sense

³ Irving Kristol, "Foreign Policy in an Age of Ideology," The National Interest, (Fall 1985): 14-15.

⁴ Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny, (The AEI Press, Washington, D.C., 1991), 221.

⁵ President Bush's address at Aspen, Colorado on 2 August 1990, 2.

⁶ Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 222.

⁷ Arthur Schlesinger, "Foreign Policy and the American Character." Foreign Affairs, 62, 1, (Fall 1983): 1.

of national pride."⁸

As a major Congressional foreign policy leader recently stated. "The United States is now the world's only superpower. Our leadership remains essential to world peace and prosperity."⁹ If there is a new world order it will be the United States that will create this new world order.¹⁰

The phrase "new world order" belongs to President Bush who borrowed it from Mikhail Gorbachev. Several President's have used phrases or mottos that were their rhetorical legacies. For example, Theodore Roosevelt-"The New Nationalism"; Wilson-"The New Freedom"; FDR-"The New Deal"; Kennedy-"The New Frontier"; Reagan-"The New Federalism" and Bush-"The New World Order." President Bush would like the New World Order to be as much his legacy as the New Deal is FDR's.¹¹ What are the guidelines of Bush's New World Order?

President Bush has given the following guidance:

About the prospects of a new world order now within our reach. For more than four decades we've lived in a world divided, East from West; a world locked in a conflict of arms and ideas called the Cold War. Two systems, two superpowers, separated by mistrust and unremitting hostility.

⁸ Alan Tonelson, "The Real National Interest," Foreign Policy, 61 (Winter 1985/86): 69.

⁹ Lee H. Hamilton, "Redirecting American Foreign Policy," Vital Speeches of the Day, 57, 14, (May 1, 1991): 419-420.

¹⁰ Charles Krauthammer, "The Lonely Superpower," The New Republic, (July 29, 1991): 27.

¹¹ Krauthammer, "The Lonely Superpower," 26.

For more than four decades, America's energies were focused on containing the threat to the free world from the forces of communism. That war is over. East Germany has vanished from the map as a separate entity . . . we saw the possibilities of a new order in which nations worked together to promote peace and prosperity.

The new world order does not mean surrendering our national sovereignty or forfeiting our interests. It refers to new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and to achieve stability, to achieve prosperity and, above all, to achieve peace.

It springs from hopes for a world based on a shared commitment among nations large and small, to a set of principles that undergird our relations. *Peaceful settlements of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples.*

The new world order really is a tool for addressing a new world of possibilities. This order gains its mission and shape not just from shared interests, but from shared ideals. And the ideals that have spawned new freedoms throughout the world have received their boldest and clearest expression in our great country the United States. Never before have so many millions drawn hope from the American idea. And the reason is simple: Unlike any other nation in the world, as Americans, we enjoy profound and mysterious bonds of affection and idealism.

What makes us American is our allegiance to an idea that all people everywhere must be free. This idea is as old and enduring as this nation itself.

The new world facing us, is a wonderful world of discovery. A world devoted to unlocking the promise of freedom.¹²

Is Bush saying anything new or is he simply repeating or rephrasing foreign policy ideals and principles that have always been important to the "American way of life"? The four principles in italics have consistently been part of American

¹² George Bush, "The Possibility of a New World Order," Vital Speeches of the Day, 57, 15, (May 15, 1991): 451-452. Italics added.

foreign policy. If America wants stability and tranquillity in the world, the United States will have to work for it. This new world order will come only from active United States participation, if not direction, in shaping it.¹³ It is a new world order that calls for a new focus on American foreign policy,¹⁴ one based on promise's of morality and universal human rights.

As the world is now changing, the United States must be an active part of that change, in a way that the United States leads the future of the world in a re-shaping process. America has won the cold war.¹⁵ But, America must be careful. Over twenty-five years ago, President Kennedy cautioned: "We must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient . . . that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity-and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem."¹⁶

Americans are not the policemen of the world nor should they take on that responsibility. What America can do, is to take Franklin D. Roosevelt's suggestion: "In the simplest terms, this is the argument for a policy different from that of the past . . . most of our history shows us to have been

¹³ Krauthammer, "The Lonely Superpower," 26.

¹⁴ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of the American Presidents, 721.

¹⁵ Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 1.

¹⁶ Arthur Schlesinger, "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, 66, 2, (Winter 1987/88): 280.

a nation leading others in the slow upward steps to better international and peaceful settlement of disagreements The time is ripe to start another chapter."¹⁷ That chapter may be the new world order, an order built on old ideals and principles-of democracy, freedom and human rights.

The primary focus of this thesis is an attempt to show that the four principles in President Bush's New World Order reflect an enduring current in U. S. foreign policy ideals across administrations throughout this century. This assessment will be undertaken through delineating, examining and evaluating three major "schools" of thought which have influenced American foreign policy. The schools are isolationism, realism and idealism.¹⁸ The assessment of those schools of thought is based on an examination of critical writings of leading architects, practitioners and specialists of America foreign policy.

The thesis seeks to suggest that these schools are constantly interacting in American politics, and constantly seeking to capture the dynamic of American foreign policy. Thus, the major objective of the thesis, is to delineate these schools, indicating their impact on particular American policies and relating them to the evolution of American

¹⁷ Paul Seabury, "Realism and Idealism," in Alexander DeConde, ed., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas, (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1978): 856.

¹⁸ Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 13.

thought to date as expressed in the ideals of the New World Order. In particular the thesis emphasizes how each school of thought impacted two enduring American concerns: morality in foreign policy and universal human rights issues.

Specifically, the thesis seeks to answer the following questions: 1) How does each school conceptualize the foreign policy system? 2) What role does each school play in forecasting the two main issues in foreign policy? 3) How effective has each school been in influencing American public opinion? And finally, 4) How effective has each school been in implementing its preferred vision?

II. THREE SCHOOLS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The three most powerful currents in American foreign policy are isolationism, realism, and idealism.¹⁹ This chapter will describe the three schools of thought in more detail. To do so, a sample of representatives writers has been selected for each of the three schools of thought. The works of these authors will be examined in order to bring out the key points of isolationism, realism and idealism.

A. ISOLATIONISM

President Washington's Farewell Address of 1796, is a classic statement of an isolationist policy.

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. . . . Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. The different course Washington advised was to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of

¹⁹ Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 12. He has identified four major currents in American foreign policy: isolationism, realism, pacifist idealism, and democratic idealism. Under idealism, pacifist idealism is included for information purposes only as a short historical background. For the purpose of this thesis, other than the historical background, pacifist idealism and democratic idealism will not be separated. They will be included as one school.

the foreign world, so far . . . as we are now at liberty to do it and to safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.²⁰

When Washington advised his countrymen to steer clear of permanent alliances, his prescription was partly motivated by the fact that there were virtually no other democracies in the world. America was among the first, and there was good reason to be careful of entanglements with countries that did not share America's democratic principles.²¹ President Washington's concern was also motivated by geography: America's greatest asset in foreign affairs is geographic isolation.²² This geographical separation to a large extent was the basis for the isolationist approach of the founding fathers.²³

Since the days of Washington, isolation has remained one of the main currents in American foreign policy. Although the term "isolationism" is today most commonly associated with the interwar years, Osgood has pointed out that "the isolationism of the thirties was distinguished from the isolationism of other periods not by the number of its

²⁰ Robert W. Tucker, A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise?, (Potomac Associates, Universe Books, New York, 1972), 25.

²¹ George P. Shultz, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," Foreign Affairs, 63, 4, (Spring 1985): 710.

²² Donald Brandon, American Foreign Policy: Beyond Utopianism and Realism, (Appleton Century Crofts, Meredith Publishing Company, New York, 1966), 23.

²³ Brandon, American Foreign Policy, 14.

adherents but by the number of its opponents."²⁴

Throughout the twentieth century, the three schools of thought, have exercised their presence during specific time periods. Thus, as World War I approached, isolationism began to surface. Most Americans wanted to avoid being drawn into the European conflict.²⁵ In 1915, at Philadelphia, President Wilson stated that ". . . America must be a special example. The example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight."²⁶ Later in 1916, he further stated, "I shall do everything within my power to keep the United States out of war."²⁷

However, America was drawn into World War I. America's entry into that war was not overwhelmingly accepted by the American people. Reluctant to be drawn into European conflicts, the American public reinforced congressional determination not to accept Wilson's big push for the League

²⁴ Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations, (The University of Chicago Press, Illinois, 1953), 364, as cited in Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 14.

²⁵ Howard R. Trenkle, "The Implications of Neo-Isolationism on Military Policy," (Essay, Army War College, Pennsylvania, 1974), 5.

²⁶ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of the American Presidents, 386.

²⁷ Trenkle, "The Implications of Neo-Isolationism on Military Policy," 5.

of Nations.

President Wilson made the following statement in support of the League of Nations. "The isolation of the United States is at an end, not because we chose to go into the politics of the world, but because by the sheer genius of this people and the growth of our power we have become a determining factor in the history of mankind, and after you have become a determining factor you cannot remain isolated, whether you want to or not."²⁸

However, the American people were not ready to foresake isolationism. As a result, the United States rejected the Treaty of Versailles with its League of Nations, and returned to the isolationism of the 19th century, along with rejecting interventionism almost entirely.²⁹ "It is only between the wars that we went from a status of being isolated to a policy of being isolationist."³⁰

The interwar period was characterized as isolationist for American foreign policy. However, Americans were criticized for failing to realize that national "security could be guaranteed through military preparedness and

²⁸ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of the American Presidents, 407-408.

²⁹ Trenkle, "The Implications of Neo-Isolationism on Military Policy," 5.

³⁰ Robert W. Tucker, "Isolation and Intervention," The National Interest, (Fall 1984), 16.

political commitments."³¹ This claim was made by the realists. Realists further claimed that policy makers disregarded the essential elements of power politics and had been guided ". . . by a politically ignorant and irresponsible moral impulsiveness, a utopian view of the problems of mitigating international conflict and a blind aversion to war and the instruments of war as absolute evils. . . ."³²

Nevertheless, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated: "despite what happens in continents overseas, the United States of America shall and must remain, as long ago the Father of our Country prayed that it might remain--unentangled and free."³³

Despite the fluctuations of isolationism, the isolationists in pre-World War II period generally repeated the arguments and theories of 1914-1917. They "believed that American intervention in the first World War had been a tragedy;" and "there should not be a second such tragedy" with

³¹ Melvyn P. Leffler, "Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism, or Diplomatic Realism: American Policy Toward Western Europe 1921-1933," Perspectives in American History, 8, (1974), 413.

³² Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations, 362, as cited in Leffler, "Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism, or Diplomatic Realism," 413.

³³ Alexander DeConde, "On Twentieth-Century Isolationism," in Alexander DeConde, ed, Isolation and Security, (Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1957), 11.

the second World War.³⁴

Isolationism of the 1940's and the 1950's differed from that of the prewar years. "Instead of opposing involvement in war or membership into international organizations," it welcomed the opportunity to flow into these channels.³⁵ For example, isolationists welcomed the opportunity to be part of the United Nations and the Korean conflict.

Before the Presidential election in 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower stated: "that isolationism in America is dead as a political issue." In 1957, at "his second inaugural address, President Eisenhower said the mutual dependence of nations 'makes isolation an impossibility. . . . No nation can longer be a fortress, lone and strong and safe. And any people, seeking such shelter for themselves, can now build only their own prison.'"³⁶

During this period of the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and even 1970s isolationism was in a dormant state. The main reason for this dormant state stems from heightened American concerns with the spread of communism and the growth of Soviet power. The 1940s and 1950s lead to a major change in world politics as America knew it. The start of the Cold War and the fear of nuclear warfare relegated isolationism and allowed the realists school to take command of America's foreign policy.

³⁴ DeConde, "On Twentieth-Century Isolationism," 21.

³⁵ DeConde, "On Twentieth-Century Isolationism," 25.

³⁶ DeConde, "On Twentieth-Century Isolationism," 32.

Now, after forty-five years, there appears to be a revival of the isolationist school. With the end of the Cold War, isolationism is beginning to reassert itself openly as a powerful political undercurrent. One major difference compared to that of early times is that "an isolationist America would not be an isolated America."³⁷

Although Charles Krauthammer is not an isolationist, he has stated that he has "great respect for American isolationism. First, because of its popular appeal and, second, because of its natural appeal. On the face of it, isolationism seems the logical, God-given foreign policy for the United States."³⁸ The geographical location of being "an island continent protected by two vast oceans bordered by two" friendly neighbors, accounts for some of that respect. He further states that "America was founded on the idea of cleansing itself of the intrigues and irrationalities, the dynastic squabbles and religious wars, of the Old World."³⁹

One writer states that the problem of isolationism is that it lacks roots in an enduring current, it takes roots in ad hoc strategies and policies cast in the form of sweeping principles such as "nonintervention" and "nonentanglement." Isolationism fluctuates in response to given situations and

³⁷ Tucker, A New Isolationism, 13. Krauthammer, "The Lonely Superpower," 24.

³⁸ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, 70, 1, (1991), 27.

³⁹ Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," 27-28.

attitudes of different groups.⁴⁰

Nevertheless, part of its continuing attraction for many Americans may stem from this key feature. Robert Tucker has written:

Isolationism is not to be identified with "quitting the world," something we have never done and will never do. It is not to be identified with the absence of all significant relationships but, rather, with the absence of certain relationships. As a policy, isolationism is above all generally characterized by the refusal to enter into alliances and to undertake military interventions. This was the essential meaning of an isolationist policy in the past, and it remains the essential meaning of an isolationist policy today.⁴¹

Some policy makers fear that a revival of isolationism would mean the absence of all significant relationships between America and the other nations of the world. However, Tucker answered this fear by saying "what they do argue is that a new isolationism, were it to prevail, would be characterized by the refusal to maintain certain relationships, to undertake certain actions, and that this refusal would in turn eventually jeopardize interests that even neo-isolationists would have to acknowledge as vital."⁴² There it is the underlining theme of isolationism, that the

⁴⁰ Kenneth W. Thompson, "Isolationism and Collective Security: The Uses and Limits of Two Theories of International Relations," in Alexander DeConde, ed, Isolationism and Security, 167-169.

⁴¹ Tucker, A New Isolationism, 12.

⁴² Tucker, A New Isolationism, 24.

United States will never pursue a policy of genuine isolationism. Although it will from time to time be very selective with whom and where it engages.

"A policy of isolationism is still found by many to imply the absence of all significant relationships between America and the other nations of the world rather than the absence of certain relationships. It is this misunderstanding that often explains the curious insistence of those who favor an isolationist policy today that they are not isolationists."⁴³

The risk today is not that America may become isolationist again, but that America is being isolated.⁴⁴ America has lost some of her prestige in the world environment. Despite being the only superpower now, leader of the economic world and sometimes the world's policemen, other nations are beginning to ask America to leave their countries, such as the Philippines, or sharply reduce the America presence, as in Europe. Indeed within the next ten years the American public will see another major change in Europe, which will be the break-up of NATO as American's know it today. America may well be sent home, and there would then be a new alliance made up of European countries only. Thus, the isolation of America is being strongly influenced by other nations in the world.

⁴³ Tucker, A New Isolationism, 117.

⁴⁴ Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Isolated America," Foreign Affairs, 51, 1, (October 1972), 4.

However, America would not become an isolated America. Nor would an America nominally isolationist, cease to play a significant role in the world. Indeed, the mere presence of American power must in itself continue to be a source of restraint for the world, since "isolationism would afford no guarantee to others that regardless of how they behaved American power could be discounted."⁴⁵

B. REALISM

"Realism" in international relations summons forth a whole host of images and concepts. "Power politics," "balance of power," "anarchy," "the national interest," and "the security dilemma" are some examples of realism's contribution to thinking on American foreign policy.⁴⁶

The realist believes that "first and foremost we are to make the world safe for ourselves."⁴⁷ They insist that the essence of realism is ". . . putting self-interest first. . . . Policy must be guided by interest, . . . and not by sentiment, ideology, or abstract principles."⁴⁸

The realist holds that power is the fundamental factor

⁴⁵ Tucker, A New Isolationism, 87-88.

⁴⁶ Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," International Studies Quarterly, 25, 2, (June 1981), 204.

⁴⁷ Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations, 273.

⁴⁸ Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 19.

in foreign affairs.⁴⁹ This conception reemerged after World War II largely in response to the emergence of communism and Soviet power as threats. As President Reagan indicated, realism posits that "we must start with a clear-eyed understanding of the world we live in."⁵⁰

While many writers believe that realism guides foreign policy, actually, realism has been the way of legitimating it: realism's usefulness has been of a rather different kind of hope.⁵¹ At the U.N. General Assembly in 1982, Secretary George Shultz had the following to say about realism. "Thus, realism shows us a world deeply troubled, yet with reason for hope. There is one necessary condition: The only way we can enhance and amplify the human potential is by preserving, defending, and extending those most precious of conditions--freedom and peace."⁵²

Most supporters of realism see it as being "practical" or "technical" in international relations. Ashley links both types, practical and technical realism, to Hans Morgenthau. For Morgenthau, "No study of politics . . . can be

⁴⁹ Brandon, American Foreign Policy, 88.

⁵⁰ William D. Anderson and Sterling J. Kernek, "How 'Realistic' is Reagan's Diplomacy?" Political Science Quarterly, 100, 3, (Fall 1985), 389.

⁵¹ Justin Rosenberg, "What's the Matter with Realism?" Review of International Studies, 16, (1990), 292.

⁵² George P. Shultz, "U.S. Foreign Policy: Realism and Progress," Department of State Bulletin, 82, 2068, (November 1982), 3.

disinterested in the sense that it is able to divorce knowledge from action"; he adopts the historian's view in peering over the statesman's shoulder, listening to his conversations, and trying to anticipate his thoughts.⁵³ Practical realism "is oriented by a practical cognitive interest. It sees the aim of knowledge as principally 'the attainment of possible consensus among actors in the framework of a self-understanding derived from tradition.'"⁵⁴ Ashley further stated that "practical realism stresses the 'uniquely human' character of its subject matter. Human beings can converse, remember, know, expect, and attach meaning to themselves and their circumstances." Yet, "human beings can also miscommunicate, forget, misunderstand, falsely expect, and summon forth forgotten experiences in ways that lend novel layers of meaning to seemingly similar circumstances."⁵⁵ This type of realism strives to analyze history and the past. It tries to communicate this character in the human being, sort of to instill it into the consensus mind. In order to bring about some type of "transhistorical normative-practical

⁵³ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1973), 224, 23, 5, as cited in Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," 209-210.

⁵⁴ Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," 210.

⁵⁵ Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," 210-211.

order."⁵⁶

On the other side, there is the technical realism that Ashley spoke of. Once again he relates technical realism in the words of Hans Morgenthau. Hans Morgenthau wrote "politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws'. . . who invokes a prior theoretical framework of 'interest defined as power'; and who values this framework because it 'imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible.'"⁵⁷ Ashley writes that "all realists are technical realists, at least in part, but it is in the so-called 'modern realism' of Kenneth Waltz that technical realism finds its starkest approval."⁵⁸ Waltz's aspect of technical realism is indicated in the meaning of theory. Waltz put it this way: "By a theory the significance of the observed is made manifest. A theory arranges phenomena so that they are seen as mutually dependent; it connects otherwise disparate facts: it shows how changes in some phenomena necessarily entail

⁵⁶ Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," 211.

⁵⁷ Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4-5, as cited in Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," 210.

⁵⁸ Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1979), as cited in Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," 215.

changes in others."⁵⁹

Realism has been strong since the 1950s in American foreign policy, because of the superpower status of the United States, and the bipolar world confronting America. The end of the Cold War has not meant the end of realism. Rather the "ends" of realism have been redefined. Krauthammer holds that realism is "back," due to the writings by people such as Tucker, Kennan, Tonelson and Layne, each of whom offered their own version or concept of realism. However, this time realism is exclusively concerned with American national interests, not with ideological ends or liberal internationalism.⁶⁰

Charles Krauthammer has pointed to a problem when national interest is the guiding principle behind U.S. foreign policy. He claims that somewhere along the line there must be more meaning than just national interest. He says "when that is done, one of three things results: (1) if it is defined strictly, the definition must be so narrow as to lead directly to (often acknowledged) isolationism; (2) if it is defined crudely and arbitrarily as a kind of synonym for ad hoc pragmatism, it is no foreign policy guide at all; (3) if it is defined expansively, it leads to a foreign policy little different in practice from the neo-internationalism it

⁵⁹ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 9-10, as cited in Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," 215.

⁶⁰ Charles Krauthammer, "The Poverty of Realism," The New Republic, (February 17, 1986), 15.

purports to critique."⁶¹

President Reagan stated that Americans must begin with a renewed realism, "a clear eyed understanding of the world we live in and of our inescapable global responsibilities." Realists see the world as it is, not as Americans wish for it to be. For realists, America must face up to certain challenges of the future as well as every opportunity that comes by the way of the United States.⁶²

C. IDEALISM

Woodrow Wilson made the following ringing statement of idealism for the League of Nations, in 1919. He said:

To the people of the world, 'Come to us; this is the home of liberty; this is the place where mankind can learn how to govern their own affairs and straighten out their own difficulties,' and the world did come to us. They saw this star in the west rising over the peoples of the world and they said, 'That is the star of hope and the star of salvation. We will set our footsteps towards the west and join that great body of men whom God has blessed with the vision of liberty.' And, believe me, my fellow countrymen, the only people in the world who are going to reap the harvest of the future are the people who can entertain ideals, who can follow ideals to the death.⁶³

In the book Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's

⁶¹ Krauthammer, "The Poverty of Realism," 16.

⁶² Ronald Reagan, United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Realism, Strength, Negotiation: Key Foreign Policy Statements of the Reagan Administration, (Washington, D.C., May, 1984), 1 and 11.

⁶³ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 408.

Destiny, Joshua Muravchik describes the difference between two groups of idealists. He refers to one group as "democratic idealists" and the other as "pacifist idealists." Both forms of idealism agree that moral considerations should govern foreign policy, but the kinship ends there. In the past, "democratic idealism has been associated frequently with America's wars, while pacifist idealism has often manifested itself in antiwar movements."⁶⁴

For the most part pacifist idealism has been associated with certain groups and their religious convictions. Furthermore, the pacifist idealists in America's history has also made it possible for America to be the pioneer in the sphere of international organizations.⁶⁵

In addition, pacifist idealists believe that peace should be maintained between governments as they currently are, and any attempt to change that structure is destabilizing to the government. The democratic idealists also believe that peace is better established by encouraging all governments to become democratic.⁶⁶

Examining America's historical background, "it seems fair to say that the Founding Fathers joined the ingredients of idealism and self-interest more successfully than have their

⁶⁴ Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 13.

⁶⁵ Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 15-17.

⁶⁶ Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 15-17.

descendants."⁶⁷ Idealism tends to be characterized by solutions which are the products of aspirations, not analysis.

The best way to define idealism is to look at the most commonly professed ideals such as honesty, truthfulness, fidelity to obligation, kindness, fair play, lawfulness, and nonintervention in other people's affairs. By noting that these ideals are ethical restraints upon egoism which operate through force of conscience, custom, or law, the meaning of the term and its significance become clearer. If one then includes the allegiance to a universal goal, that is some state of affairs believed to be of benefit to all mankind (such as peace, goodwill, justice among nations, freedoms, and a decent standard of living for all), the definition of idealism becomes complete.⁶⁸

At President Kennedy's Inaugural Address, in 1961, he invoked the idealist concept in American political thought. Kennedy made the following call to the nation and to the world, when he said: "Let every nation know, . . . that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty. This much we pledge-and more. . . . United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do--for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder."⁶⁹ President Reagan also invoked idealism when he stated that

⁶⁷ Brandon, American Foreign Policy, 17.

⁶⁸ Michael D. Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in The Implementation of Foreign Policy - The Arms Trade: A Source of Conflict," (MA Thesis, Oriel College, 1975), 2.

⁶⁹ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 604.

"idealism and fair play are the core of our system and our strength."⁷⁰ Neither president based his foreign policy in idealism alone. Simply, idealism in foreign policy lacks an awareness of "power" in international relations. Robert Osgood pointed to a central dilemma for idealists when he wrote:

. . . Idealists. . ., who seek to spread liberty, equal opportunity, and material progress throughout the world, will find that these worthy objects depend, first of all, upon the survival of the United States and its allies; and realizing this, they will be forced to put the exigencies of power politics ahead of their moral sensibilities. Similarly, if they want to pursue their ideals effectively, they must base American aid to foreign peoples primarily upon the power advantage of the United States and only secondarily upon humanitarian considerations. They must, at times, support reactionary and antidemocratic regimes with arms and money. They must even put themselves in the position of resisting with force the misguided proponents of a social revolution, which arises, in large part, from basic human aspirations which the American mission itself claims to fulfill.⁷¹

At times it may appear that idealists compromise their stand on an issue when faced with threats of such magnitude as fascism and communism. But, for many idealists in reality idealism is just taking a step back to regroup in order to hit the opposition head on.

Realists have directly challenged the premises of

⁷⁰ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 748.

⁷¹ Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations, 438, as cited in Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in the Implementation of Foreign Policy," 11-12.

idealism. Thus, Charles Krauthammer holds that "idealism in foreign policy is moralism misplaced and dangerous. That such idealism--a mix of universalism, sentimentalism, and ideological utopianism--has characterized American foreign policy since its emergence from 19th-century and, later, interwar isolationism."⁷²

Robert Osgood states that self-interested ends are the most compelling national ends. He holds that survival and the national self-interest goals are compatible in the idealistic end of this idealistic world. Osgood also states that the instability of idealism can be attributed to the incompatibility of the fundamental ideals and the most basic national interests.⁷³

Reflecting the interplay of idealism and realism in American foreign policy, President Reagan stated that "all Americans share two great goals for foreign policy: a safer world and a world in which individual rights can be respected and precious values may flourish. These goals are at the heart of America's traditional idealism and our aspirations for world peace. Yet, while cherished by us, they do not belong exclusively to us. They're not 'made in America.' They're shared by people everywhere."⁷⁴

⁷² Krauthammer, "The Poverty of Realism," 14.

⁷³ Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations, 17.

⁷⁴ Reagan, Realism, Strength, Negotiation, 10.

The idealism school of thought continually surfaces over the course of America's history. That is why idealism remains a strong force in the American foreign policy.⁷⁵

D. SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT

Specific events in the twentieth century have triggered either isolationism, realism or idealism. All three are enduring currents in American foreign policy that have always been present. The particular school that was triggered in response to events was dependent upon the threat or situation that was present. For example isolationism was stronger in the interwar years following the first World War. Realism took the lead after the second World War and during the cold war. Last idealism has been interjected in both time periods as the opportunity arose.

To illustrate this point, this summary and assessment will briefly examine the threat of communism that occurred in the twentieth century. At the end of the first World War, communism triumphed in the Soviet Union. From a secure base in the USSR and drawing upon local conditions, the power of communism continued to build throughout the twenties and thirties.

America withdrew to an isolationist state. This was best exemplified by America's "refusal to join the League of

⁷⁵ Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations, 322.

Nations."⁷⁶ The isolationism of the twenties and thirties continued until America entered the second World War. During the second World War realism ruled America foreign policy. America was at war and the mission was to win and bring peace back into the world.

Krauthammer stated that "after World War II the United States became the dominant power in the world and internationalism became the guiding ideology of its foreign policy."⁷⁷ At the end of the war, America followed its normal pattern of bringing troops home, demobilizing forces and reducing the military down to a skeleton position.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, "World War II discredited . . . isolationism long enough to bring to prominence a new generation of Americans who had been born just before or during World War I and who were much influenced by the bankruptcy of interwar isolationism."⁷⁹ America could have easily stepped back into a state of isolationism after the war had it not been for actions of America's adversary; the Soviet Union. The threat of communism and nuclear rivalry kept America out of isolationism and continued America's World War II realism.

⁷⁶ Bernard H. Zaffern, "Isolationism--The Second Time Around?" (Essay, Army War College, Pennsylvania, 1972), 2.

⁷⁷ Charles Krauthammer, "Isolationism, Left and Right," The New Republic, (March 4, 1985), 18.

⁷⁸ Zaffern, "Isolationism," 9.

⁷⁹ John C. Chalberg, "George Kennan: Realist as Moralist," Reviews in American History, 17, 3, (September 1989), 485.

With the start of the Cold War, American policy-makers knew that they had inherited something more than just a new policy prescription. Kennan stated that ". . . utopian in expectations, legalistic in concept, moralistic in the demands it seemed to place on others, and self-righteous in the degree of high-mindedness and rectitude . . . to ourselves."⁸⁰

After forty-five years of stark confrontation between communism in the Soviet Union and democracy in the United States, the Cold War is over. America won the Cold War. Victory in the Cold War reflects the triumphs of the techniques of realism and the goals of idealism in American foreign policy. As one astute observer has remark, "not on the strength of its arms or the skill of its diplomats, but by virtue of the power of the democratic ideas on which the American system is based and the failure of the Communist idea."⁸¹ It has been said, with the Cold War over, that if America can spread democracy to the majority of humankind, then the twenty-first century will become the true American century.⁸²

Muravchik cautions that "as the Communist threat recedes, the currents of realism and isolationism are sure to gather strength on the conservative side of the political

⁸⁰ George Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963, (1972), 70-71, as cited in Chalberg, "George Kennan," 483.

⁸¹ Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 1.

⁸² Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 10.

spectrum."⁸³ Nevertheless, if realism and isolationism grow in strength, then idealism will grow in strength also.

"Realism is not isolationism, but can be and seems increasingly drawn to it."⁸⁴ They are two totally separate entities. Although many policy-makers believe that realism is identified with power politics only, today the "new realists seem less inclined toward the notion of 'interest defined as power' or to practice of balance-of-power politics."⁸⁵

The question of realism versus idealism is often regarded as a philosophical argument which is not clearly applicable in today's complex decision-making process of foreign policy.⁸⁶ Realism "is often characterized as marking the end of the utopian stage of human thinking as it places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes and consequences. Thus while idealism concentrates on aspirations, realism focuses on the acceptance of facts, especially in a political context, on the nature and effects of power."⁸⁷

However, most realists are aware of the integration

⁸³ Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 48.

⁸⁴ Krauthammer, "The Poverty of Realism," 22.

⁸⁵ Krauthammer, "The Poverty of Realism," 22.

⁸⁶ Michael D. Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in The Implementation of Foreign Policy," 1.

⁸⁷ Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in the Implementation of Foreign Policy," 2.

between realism and idealism, and that "there are valid arguments for maintaining the vitality of a country's ideals."⁸⁸ This interaction between realism and idealism may create a situation where a nation may have to sacrifice its short-run ideals in order to achieve them in the long-run.⁸⁹ America's ultimate victory in the Cold War provides a critical example of the trade-offs between short-run tactics and long-run ideals.

Osgood superbly states the importance of idealism and realism in foreign policy when he says:

In its broadest aspect, the interdependence of universal ideals and national self-interest is simply a reflection of the fact that man has a moral sense as well as an ego and that both parts demand satisfaction. For this reason the most compelling national ends are those self-interested ends, like survival, which are most easily reconciled with idealistic ends, and those idealistic ends, like the minimum standards of international decency, which are most compatible with national self-interest. By the same token the instability of self-assertive egoism and altruistic idealism can be attributed, in large part, to the incompatibility of the former with fundamental ideals and of the latter with the most basic national interests.⁹⁰

Therefore, it can be concluded that this interdependence, along with confrontation "between realism and idealism does

⁸⁸ Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in the Implementation of Foreign Policy," 6.

⁸⁹ Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in the Implementation of Foreign Policy," 7.

⁹⁰ Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations, 17, as cited in Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in the Implementation of Foreign Policy," 7-8.

exist and is not simply a theoretical concept." Policy-makers are aware of the existing battle, and consequently many work to ensure that the "expression of divergent views at all levels" does not "prevent the sacrificing of ideals by bureaucratic rule." Nonetheless, in spite of all their efforts, "the balance is practically always tipped in favor of the realists." Yet when idealists expressed their views, they "do have their moments of triumph" in American foreign policy.⁹¹

America is at a crossroad in history, what happens from here depends on which school predominates. Which school of thought will America's policy-makers lean toward the most? As this chapter has tried to point out all three schools of thought are equally important. They all have had there moments in American foreign policy. Furthermore, because the schools are enduring currents in American foreign policy, they will continue to influence America's policy-makers.

The next chapter examines the impact of morality on foreign policy issues, and how this interaction relates to the evolution of American thought. The chapter attempts to accomplish this by examining issues of morality in general, the moral dilemma of nuclear strategy, and the Just War theory. In particular its focus is to determine how each of these issues impact the overall ideals of Washington's New

⁹¹ Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in the Implementation of Foreign Policy," 48.

World Order.

III. MORALITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

A. MORALITY IN FOREIGN POLICY

Morality has been a constant force shaping the United States. In their private lives, Americans place priority on moral values. In the public realm the United States was founded on a principle of morally good for all, and within this principle America attempts to give its people a better way of life.

This section of the thesis will focus on the links policy writers and presidents have sought to establish between morality and foreign policy. As a specific illustration of dilemmas for policy makers, this chapter also examines morality and nuclear war and the idealism between the theory of just wars and needed war.

A critical question is, "what is the impact of morality in American foreign policy?" and how do the three schools address moral issues in international relations. Morality in foreign policy does not mean preaching one's religious views to another. George Kennan said, "Let us face it: in most international differences elements of right or wrong, comparable to those which prevail in personal relationships, are--if they exist at all--simply not discernible to the outsider. . . . Morality, then, as the channel to individual self-fulfillment--yes. Morality in governmental method, as a matter of conscience and preference on the part of our people--yes. But morality as a general criterion for measuring and

comparing the behavior of different states--no."⁹² It does mean, however, a way of being able to agree on how to operate this country. What is morally right for one person may not be morally right for another. Yet, people have to live, work, and play together in this country and within the world.

Americans are a "moral people."⁹³ The very foundation of this country claims that fact. Furthermore, the very foundation of our American foreign policy will be governed by moral precepts.⁹⁴ "Morality in foreign policy, consists not in preaching one's values to lesser breeds but in living up to them oneself. The moral force of any foreign policy derives from the moral vitality of the national community, and the test of that vitality lies in the character of policies at home."⁹⁵

Many writers feel that moral standards are simply "cultural artifacts" which people need in order to survive the stresses of this life. But, without these standards Americans would not be able to handle the everyday toll that

⁹² Paul Seabury, "The Moral Purposes and Philosophical Bases of American Foreign Policy," ORBIS, 20, 1, (Spring 1976), 5.

⁹³ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 560.

⁹⁴ Seabury, "Realism and Idealism," 859.

⁹⁵ Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History, (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1986), 81.

life takes on people.⁹⁶ Similarly, without a moral anchor a nation cannot use its foreign policy as a focus around which others will freely choose to gather.

When looking at issues of morality in foreign policy one cannot overlook the great works of George Kennan. Kennan wrote several articles on morality and foreign policy. He was a realist, who at the same time, had an idealistic look on foreign policy. Kennan wrote that:

First of all, the conduct of diplomacy is the responsibility of governments. . . . This responsibility is not diminished by the fact that government, in formulating foreign policy, may choose to be influenced by private opinion. What we are talking about, . . . when we attempt to relate moral considerations to foreign policy, is the behavior of governments, Second, let us recognize that the functions, commitments and moral obligations of governments are not the same as those of the individual. Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, Finally, let us note that there are no internationally accepted standards of morality to which the U.S. Government could appeal if it wished to act in the name of moral principles. . . . When we talk about the application of moral standards to foreign policy, . . . we are not talking about compliance with some clear and generally accepted international code of behavior. If the policies and actions of the U.S. government are to be made to conform to moral standards, those standards are going to have to be America's own, founded on traditional American principles of justice and propriety. When others fail to conform to those principles, and when their failure to conform has an adverse effect on American interests, as distinct from political tastes, we have every right to complain and . . . to take retaliatory action. What we cannot do is to assume that our moral standards

⁹⁶ Geoffrey Vickers, "The Future of Morality," Futures, 11, 5, (October 1979), 382.

are theirs as well, and to appeal to those standards as the source of our grievances.⁹⁷

George Kennan further stated that the United States will follow a foreign policy shaped by moral principles.⁹⁸ These principles will be the driving force behind American foreign policy.⁹⁹

It is claimed by some policymakers that morality has nothing to do with the vital interests of America's foreign policy, but at the same time they hold that "morality is an aspect of foreign policy"¹⁰⁰ Others believe that "morality is the best policy" in foreign affairs, because it gives a nation the opportunity to promote its national interest via their moral preferences.¹⁰¹

These differences stem from the reason the "morality and foreign policy" controversy remains an enduring issue in the American political arena. It has to do with the very nature of what America stands for. "Unlike other nations, which are based on the realities of tribe, race, ethnicity, or language,

⁹⁷ George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, 64, 2, (Winter 1985/86), 205-208.

⁹⁸ Muravchik, Exporting Democracy, 21.

⁹⁹ Eugen Loeb1, "Moral Values and U.S. Policy: An End to the Age of Hypocrisy?" Strategic Review, 14, 2, (Spring 1986), 32.

¹⁰⁰ Kenneth W. Thompson, "Moral Reasoning in American Thought on War and Peace," The Review of Politics, 39, 3, (July 1977), 386-387.

¹⁰¹ Felix D. Oppenheim, "National Interest, Rationality, and Morality," Political Theory, 15, 3, (August 1987), 381.

the United States is a country whose casements rest on an idea."¹⁰² The unity of America is based on the unity of an ideal. Projection that ideal abroad serves to strengthen it at home.

Many writers suggest several ways in which morality can enter into the American foreign policy arena. Thus, Bennett and Seifert hold that first, morality "should determine the fundamental motives and attitudes of citizens and policymakers. . . . The second way in which morality should influence policy is in the criteria that determine immediate and long-range objectives. . . . The third way in which morality should influence policy is that nations should accept moral limits on the means that they will use. George Kennan, . . . says that 'we should conduct ourselves at all times in such a way as to satisfy our own ideas of morality.'"¹⁰³

Still, other writers argue that moral principles in foreign policy should apply and have "an identity between the morality of individuals and the morality of states."¹⁰⁴ Although Arthur Schlesinger feels that this function would be

¹⁰² George Weigel, "Exorcising Wilson's Ghost: Morality and Foreign Policy in America's Third Century," The Washington Quarterly, 10, 4, (Autumn 1987), 31.

¹⁰³ John C. Bennett and Harvey Seifert, U.S. Foreign Policy and Christian Ethics, (The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1977), 29-30.

¹⁰⁴ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. "National Interests and Moral Absolutes," in Ernest W. Lefever, ed., Ethics and World Politics: Four Perspectives, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1972), 22.

hard to accomplish, nevertheless, he further says that "moral judgment is possible and necessary" in the foreign affairs arena.¹⁰⁵

Even the arch realist, Hans Morgenthau, stated that ". . . the rule of morality in this respect is not precisely the same between nations as between individuals. The duty of making its own welfare the guide of its actions, is much stronger upon the former than upon the latter; in proportion to the greater magnitude and importance of national compared with individual happiness, and to the greater permanency of the effects of national than of individual conduct."¹⁰⁶ Morgenthau went on to say, "universal moral principles cannot be applied to states in their abstract formulation, but . . . must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place."¹⁰⁷ Far from denying morality, Morgenthau's key point seems to be that one nation cannot just apply its moral principles to another nation anytime it wishes to make it happen. Context, opportunity and timing are critical when a nation seeks to shape the moral bases of another.

It has been said that moral principles enter most

¹⁰⁵ Schlesinger, "National Interests and Moral Absolutes," 22.

¹⁰⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Founding Fathers and Foreign Policy: Implications for the Late Twentieth Century," ORBIS, 20, 1, (Spring 1976), 21.

¹⁰⁷ Robert H. Johnson, "Misguided Morality: Ethics and the Reagan Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly, 105, 3, (Fall 1980), 513.

effectively into foreign policy through the idea of national interest. Morality is not designed to supply the function of foreign policy, but rather, to "clarify and civilize conceptions of national interest."

Morality in foreign policy lends itself to some very hard decisions. First, several issues in foreign policy will not fit into the moral criteria. Second, governments must make decisions at different levels than what is required of individuals. Third, morality is not based upon an international moral consensus, but upon an individual nation's consensus and perception.¹⁰⁸

However, moral judgment involves living with some degree of uncertainty. Especially, because of the uncertainty it takes, moral judgment can sometimes lead to greater understanding and more responsible behavior.¹⁰⁹ As a result, people may never know the effect of their actions. On the other hand, moral judgment teaches that people and governments learn to accept the consequences of their actions, even the ones that they can not fix.¹¹⁰

In February 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz stated that, "America also has a moral responsibility. The lesson

¹⁰⁸ Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History, 73.

¹⁰⁹ Ernest W. Lefever, "Morality Versus Moralism in Foreign Policy," in Ernest W. Lefever, ed., Ethics and World Politics, 1.

¹¹⁰ Kenneth W. Thompson, "American Foreign Policy: Values Renewed or Discovered," ORBIS, 20, 1, (Spring 1976), 133.

of the postwar era is that America must be the leader of the free world; there is no one else to take our place. The nature and extent of our support--whether moral support or something more--necessarily varies from case to case. But there should be no doubt where our sympathies lie."¹¹¹ Henry Kissinger, also saw the utility of morality in the formation of America's winning Cold War coalition. As he stated, "our goal should be to build a moral consensus which can make a pluralistic world creative rather than destructive."¹¹²

Morality in American foreign policy should consider what is best for the "American way of life." However, "in an imperfect world, few opportunities for morally pure actions arise for leaders." These leaders should not "pretend that interests and values will" correspond when they are forced to make bad decisions.¹¹³

Many of the great writings that relate to morality in foreign policy were presented and articulated by the Presidents of the United States. It would appear that these leaders insisted on setting a standard or guide for the actions of the United States and others. Several examples may serve to illustrate the critical role played by leading Presidents.

¹¹¹ Robert J. Myers, "The Virtue of Moral Restraint," International Journal, 43, 2, (Spring 1989), 332.

¹¹² Linda B. Miller, "Morality in Foreign Policy: A Failed Consensus?" DAEDALUS, 109, 3, (Summer 1980), 145.

¹¹³ Miller, "Morality in Foreign Policy," 158.

"Jefferson's claim was, of course, a moral claim. Its impact on U.S. foreign policy, for better and for worse and often for both, derives from its universality. The Founding Fathers did not pledge their 'lives, fortunes, and sacred honor' to a narrow claim, but to a simple, flat, universal claim: All men are created equal."¹¹⁴

President Wilson stated: "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. . . . Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own."¹¹⁵ Wilson has been identified as the focal point for the issues of morality and foreign policy debates in the twentieth century.¹¹⁶

Wilson delivered the following speech in Philadelphia on Independence Day in 1917: "My dream is that as the years go by and the world knows more and more of America it . . . will turn to America for those moral inspirations which lie at the basis of all freedom . . . and that America will come into the full light of day when all shall know that she puts human rights above all other rights, and that her flag is the flag not only of America, but of humanity."¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Weigel, "Exorcising Wilson's Ghost," 32.

¹¹⁵ Seabury, "Realism and Idealism," 862.

¹¹⁶ Weigel, "Exorcising Wilson's Ghost," 32.

¹¹⁷ Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations, 178.

Franklin D. Roosevelt stated: "morality must and will win in the end. Our national policy is . . . committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers."¹¹⁸

Dwight D. Eisenhower said that America can "feel this moral strength because we know that we are not helpless prisoners of history. We are free men."¹¹⁹

In Kennedy's famous speech his moral ideas were echoed: "Let every nation know, . . . that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."¹²⁰

President Ford stated that "America is morally and spiritually number one and that will be the force to keep us moving so that America, and all its people, its government, will be number one forever."¹²¹ He made this statement right after the nightmare that America came through with the Vietnam War.

Finally, as President Reagan indicated: ". . . There is a great spiritual awakening in America, a renewal of the

¹¹⁸ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 509.

¹¹⁹ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 567.

¹²⁰ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 604.

¹²¹ Bennett and Seifert, U.S. Foreign Policy and Christian Ethics, 75.

traditional values that have been the bedrock of America's goodness and greatness. . . . America is in the midst of a spiritual awakening and moral renewal. . . . We will never give way our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace."¹²²

Arthur Schlesinger holds that the greatest American Presidents in the twentieth century were Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, because of their ability to motivate people with their overwhelming influence. They had earned the right to speak of justice and freedom abroad, because of their outstanding records at home.¹²³ However, going one step further, this thesis would add to Schlesinger's list the names of Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and tentatively George Bush. Jimmy Carter is submitted, because of his idealistic concept of human rights and moral principles. Ronald Reagan should be included because he believed that America was in a "moral renewal." George Bush is submitted because he is articulating the concept of the New World Order, a concept which has features of the enduring American linkage of idealism - realism.

These illustrations may serve to illustrate that America believes that foreign policy should reflect a moral framework. Even convinced realists have sought to use "power" abroad to

¹²² Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 758-759.

¹²³ Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History, 81.

fulfill a moral agenda at home. Thus, Hans Morgenthau stated: "the purpose of foreign policy is not to bring enlightenment or happiness to the rest of the world but to take care of the life, liberty and happiness of the American people."¹²⁴

Secretary of State George Shultz stated that "Americans, being a moral people, want their foreign policy to reflect the values we espouse as a nation. But Americans, being a practical people, also want their foreign policy to be effective. If we truly care about our values, we must be prepared to defend them and advance them. Thus we as a nation are perpetually asking ourselves how to reconcile our morality and our practical sense, how to pursue noble goals in a complex and imperfect world, how to relate our strength to our purposes."¹²⁵ Nowhere has this critical imperative been more evident than in the formulation of America's nuclear strategy.

B. THE MORAL DILEMMA OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY

The U.S. Catholic Bishops letter, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, was an provocative piece of work on nuclear warfare. They based their position on the teaching of the Catholic church and their principle of conscience teaching. The bishops strongly condemned all

¹²⁴ Kenneth W. Thompson, "The Ethical Dimensions of Diplomacy," The Review of Politics, 43, 3, (July 1984), 377-380.

¹²⁵ George Shultz, United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Realism, Strength, Negotiation: Key Foreign Policy Statements of the Reagan Administration, (Washington, D.C., May 1984), 7.

operational use of nuclear weapons and planning for any kind of nuclear war. More controversially, the bishop's declared that all operational use of nuclear weapons must be avoided, even at the price of surrender.

In this pastoral letter, the bishops' arguments point out moral difficulties associated with the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence only, but accept nuclear deterrence in "strictly conditioned" circumstances.¹²⁶ "Our threat to fight back will dissuade an opponent only if he thinks we are able and if necessary willing to fight back . . ."¹²⁷

This section will attempt to explore several moral and ethical issues related to Nuclear Strategy. The most salient topics are deterrence, war, and disarmament.

1. Nuclear Deterrence

The U.S. Bishops' letter acknowledges that every nation has a right and duty to defend itself against aggression. They strive to place conditional moral limits on the concept of deterrence, without making specific moral judgment on deterrence. The letter acknowledges that possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrent can be morally

¹²⁶ Malham M. Wakin, War, Morality, and the Military Profession (Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1986), 463.

¹²⁷ Albert Wohlstetter, "Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists On the Bombing of Innocents," Commentary, (June 1983), 31.

acceptable.¹²⁸

Caspar Weinberger held that, "Deterrence remains the cornerstone of our defense policy. We continue to seek nuclear and conventional capabilities sufficient to convince any potential aggressor that the costs of aggression would exceed any potential gains that he might achieve."¹²⁹ The bishops stated "that essentially, deterrence means dissuasion of a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict, often by the threat of unacceptable retaliatory damage."¹³⁰

Several mainline churches have rejected nuclear use under any circumstances. For example, the United Methodist Bishops rejected the very basis of U.S. nuclear policy, such as deterrence, by labeling it "idolatry" and stated that ". . . deterrence must not receive the churches' blessing even as a temporary warrant for holding on to nuclear weapons."¹³¹ Churches representing almost half of the American population

¹²⁸ Don B. Ginder, and Irvin Hicks, "On Peace and War: A Study of Morality and U.S. Strategic Nuclear Politics," (Essay, Army War College, Pennsylvania, 1983), 9.

¹²⁹ LeRoy F. Foreman, "A Just War In The Nuclear Age: The Implications of the American Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on War and Peace," (Essay, National War College, 1984), 16.

¹³⁰ National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, (Washington, D.C., United States Catholic Conference Office of Publishing and Promotion and Services, May, 1983), 163.

¹³¹ Keith B. Payne, and Jill Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and Just War Theory: Are They Compatible?" Comparative Strategy, 7, 1, (1988), 75.

have either rejected outright or called into question the U.S. deterrence program, they felt that the use of nuclear force under any circumstances is a serious development.¹³²

Unfortunately, solutions to the issues of nuclear deterrence and to nuclear use have severe problems. The first problem is implicit U.S. nuclear disarmament. The second problem is that the policy proposed by Christian nuclear pacifists amounts to basing U.S. deterrence policy on a big bluff.¹³³

The moral and political paradox posed by deterrence was concisely stated by Vatican II:

Undoubtedly, armaments are not amassed merely for use in wartime. Since the defensive strength of any nation is thought to depend on its capacity for immediate retaliation, the stockpiling of arms . . . serves, . . . as a deterrent to potential attackers. Many people look upon this as the most effective way . . . for maintaining some sort of peace among nations. Whatever one may think . . . people are convinced that the arms race, . . . is no infallible way of maintain real peace Rather than eliminate the causes of war, the arms race serves only to aggravate the position. New approaches, based on reformed attitudes, will have to be chosen in order to remove this stumbling block, to free the earth from its pressing anxieties, and give back to the world a genuine peace.¹³⁴

Pope John Paul II makes this statement about the morality

¹³² Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and Just War Theory," 76.

¹³³ Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and Just War Theory," 77.

¹³⁴ The Challenge of Peace, 167.

of deterrence: "In current conditions 'deterrence' based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable."¹³⁵

The bishops stated the following three points in response to the above statement:

First, if nuclear deterrence exists only to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others, then proposals to go beyond this planning for prolonged periods of repeated nuclear strikes . . . are not acceptable. They encourage notions that nuclear war can be engaged in with tolerable human and moral consequences. . . . Second, if nuclear deterrence is our goal, "sufficiency" to deter is an adequate strategy; Finally, nuclear deterrence should be used as a step on the way toward progressive disarmament. Each proposed addition to our strategic system or change in strategic doctrine must be assessed precisely in light of whether it will render steps toward "progressive disarmament" more or less likely.¹³⁶

For some, the fact that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 means that deterrence has worked, and this fact satisfies the demands of both the political and the moral order. This fact that deterrence seems to have worked so well for forty years says something profound: nuclear pacifism may be too risky to supplant a tried and tested policy.¹³⁷

To abandon deterrence is to neglect the duty to defend

¹³⁵ The Challenge of Peace, 173.

¹³⁶ The Challenge of Peace, 188.

¹³⁷ Raymond English, ed., Ethics and Nuclear Arms: European and American Perspectives, (Academy of Political Science, New York, 1983), 9.

the innocent, to preserve the Constitution and the Republic, and to keep safe the very idea of political liberty. No President by the virtue of his oath to office can so act, nor can a moral people of a democratic nation.¹³⁸

Nevertheless, the moral critique of deterrence holds that the actual use of nuclear weapons, even in retaliation, is never justified. As the bishops put it, one is morally obliged to "say no to nuclear war."¹³⁹

2. Nuclear War

"The moral duty today is to prevent nuclear war from ever occurring and to protect and preserve those key values of justice, freedom and independence which are necessary for personal dignity and national integrity."¹⁴⁰

Many people who are not opposed to war in principle will call themselves "nuclear pacifists," because they believe that it can never be justified to fight a war with nuclear weapons. Pacifism of this kind has always been the conviction of a minority.¹⁴¹

It is possible to justify the right to go to war, and to

¹³⁸ Wakin, War, Morality, and the Military Profession, 493.

¹³⁹ Charles Krauthammer, "On Nuclear Morality," Commentary, 76, 4, (October 1983), 49.

¹⁴⁰ John Langan, "Challenges to The Challenge of Peace: The Moral Debate on Nuclear Deterrence," The Washington Quarterly, 11, 3, (Summer 1988), 95.

¹⁴¹ Anthony J.P. Kenny, The Logic of Deterrence, (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1985), 6.

morally wage war, provided that certain conditions are met. To be justified, war must be an instrument of policy: it must be a means to a desirable and morally defensible goal. Victory is not a goal which justifies war: to justify a war a state must be able to bring out the good to be achieved by victory.¹⁴² The Just War section will address several of the questions of when it is justified to go to war.

The Methodist pastoral letter states that, "there is no just cause which can warrant the waging of nuclear war or any use of nuclear weapons." The Catholic Bishops state that, "deterrence itself is temporarily acceptable because it serves to inhibit nuclear war--an evil greater than the mere possession of nuclear weapons."¹⁴³

3. Nuclear Disarmament

Three signs of the times have particularly influenced the writing of the bishops letter. The first, to quote Pope John Paul II at the United Nations, is that "the world wants peace, the world needs peace." The second is the judgment of Vatican II about the arms race: "The arms race is one of the greatest curses on the human race and the harm it inflicts upon the poor is more than can be endured." The third is the way in which the unique dangers and dynamics of the nuclear arms race present qualitatively new problems which must be

¹⁴² Kenny, The Logic of Deterrence, 8-9.

¹⁴³ Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and Just War Theory," 77.

addressed by fresh applications of traditional moral principles.¹⁴⁴

4. Summary and Assessment

Weapons in themselves are not evil, but the evil occurs from the people who use them. These weapons can be used both for good and evil intentions. The morally accepted standards occur from the intended use and the purposes of those who manufacture and deploy them.¹⁴⁵

American leaders are restrained by the moral sensitivities of the American people. Ultimately, the power of the U.S. rests not upon technology and weapon systems but upon the resolution and conviction of the American people. Clausewitz argued that public support for the policies of the state are vital for any military success: "One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt (of the sword), while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely honed blade."¹⁴⁶

Henry Kissinger stated: "Morality without security is ineffectual; security without morality is empty. To establish the relationship and proportion between these two goals is perhaps the most profound challenge before our government and

¹⁴⁴ The Challenge of Peace, 13.

¹⁴⁵ Kenny, The Logic of Deterrence, 14.

¹⁴⁶ Lloyd J. Matthews, and Dale E. Brown, The Parameters of Military Ethics, (Pergamon-Brassey's, International Defense Publishers, Inc., Virginia, 1989), 25.

our nation."¹⁴⁷

Although nuclear deterrence has been subject to significant conditions from many moralists, no one has come up with a better solution. In fact, the theory of deterrence is as old as armed conflict. It means nothing more than doing those things that will discourage attack by an enemy force. What moralists dislike about nuclear deterrence is its implicit threat to actually use the weapons.¹⁴⁸ If the possession or use of nuclear weapons is in violation of fundamental religious precepts of morality, then the security of our nation by endorsing those moral precepts will simply be considered a burden that must be borne.¹⁴⁹

America has the moral responsibility to protect the values of justice, freedom and order in the international arena. All mankind has the absolute moral right to be protected. International affairs has a moral responsibility to avoid nuclear war or nuclear conflict at all costs. The moral problem of the nuclear age is how to keep the peace and how to ensure that it is a just peace, one which preserves the freedom of nations, and their right to development. America and the world has a moral duty to prevent nuclear war from

¹⁴⁷ Matthews and Brown, The Parameters of Military Ethics, 26.

¹⁴⁸ Matthews and Brown, The Parameters of Military Ethics, 47.

¹⁴⁹ Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and Just War Theory," 78.

ever occurring and to protect and preserve those key values of justice, freedom, and independence which are necessary for democracy to continue.¹⁵⁰

C. THE JUST WAR THEORY

One of the criteria of the just-war teaching is that there must be a reasonable hope of success in bringing about justice and peace.¹⁵¹ The moral theory of the Just-War doctrine begins with the presumption which binds all Christians: "We should do no harm to our neighbors; how we treat our enemy is the key test of whether we love our neighbor; and the possibility of taking even one human life is a prospect we should consider in fear and trembling."¹⁵²

Just war theory provides a rationale for conducting war, this theory contains two parts, "jus ad bellum" and "jus in bello." Jus ad bellum addresses the principles concerning the reasons for war, whereas jus in bello treats the morality of war, and how the war is fought.¹⁵³

Jus ad bellum looks at the conditions which allow a war to be considered just or morally acceptable. These conditions are:

¹⁵⁰ The Challenge of Peace, 175.

¹⁵¹ The Challenge of Peace, vii.

¹⁵² The Challenge of Peace, 80.

¹⁵³ Ginder and Hicks, "On Peace and War," 28.

First, Competent Authority: War can only be waged by properly constituted governments and only in accordance with the properly constituted laws of the nation. War cannot be waged by private parties. . . . The state must be acting within its constitution and laws. . . . This requirement for war is particularly important in a democratic society. Second, Just Cause: To justify the resort to violence and killing involved in war, there must be sufficient reason which would outweigh the evil inherent in the conduct of war. Just cause covers the following: a) self-defense and assistance to other nations under attack. b) restoration of rights wrongfully denied. c) securing peace, punishing evil-doers, and uplifting the good. In view of the violence and destruction of modern warfare, any aggressive form of war is seen to be immoral since the damage appears to be disproportionate Thus, at the moment, there is a consensus among moral teachers that the only just cause valid today is self-defense and assistance to other nations under attack. Third, Right Intention: The war must be fought for the intention, either of achieving some good or avoiding some evil. St. Augustine said: "We do not seek peace to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace." Peace should be the ultimate objective of war, Fourth, Last resort: War causes such serious harm, that it should not be entered into unless all reasonable efforts have been exhausted to resolve the dispute peacefully. . . . Fifth, Proportionality: The good to be achieved or the evil to be avoided must be proportionate to the cost or harm of the war. . . . The consensus among churches and theologians is that basically only wars of self-defense and assistance to other nations can meet the proportionality requirement. Sixth, Probability of Success: It is necessary that there be a probability of a successful outcome of the war. Finally, Comparative Justice: This principle emphasizes the presumption against war which stands at the beginning of just-war teaching.¹⁵⁴

The jus ad bellum conditions are mere guidelines which can be followed by government and military leaders as well as private

¹⁵⁴ The Challenge of Peace, 85-99. Ginder and Hicks, "On Peace and War," 28-32.

citizens in assessing the morality of war. The underlying theory is that human life is important and can only be taken in war under certain conditions.

When it has been determined that a war is just, the policymakers, need to look at the morality of the conduct of the war, in essence the means of war. Jus in bello provides two basic principles for the consideration of the morality of military operations, tactics and strategy.

First, Principle of Discrimination: War may not be conducted in such a manner as to kill civilian noncombatants. Acts of war must be aimed at the enemy's military forces. Innocent bystanders should be immune from direct attack. This principle is based on limiting the taking of life to only that which directly threatens. Just war permits the taking of life, but only in self-defense. Thus the principle of discrimination establishes the following prohibitions against killing: a) civilian noncombatants. b) prisoners of war when they are no longer a military threat. c) the wounded, since they are no longer a threat.¹⁵⁵

The principle of discrimination was a concept that was developed several years ago, when technology was primitive. Some policymakers believe that modern warfare requires a reexamination of the concept of civilian noncombatants, since it involves massive damage and destruction to entire populations. War is not a respecter of persons and the conduct of war results in civilian noncombatant casualties. Basically, this principle holds that civilian noncombatant casualties are morally acceptable if they are an unintended

¹⁵⁵ Ginder and Hicks, "On Peace and War," 32-33.

result of a morally permissible action against a military target.¹⁵⁶

The second principle for assessing the morality of military strategy, tactics and operations is proportionality. "This dictates against the excessive use of force by holding that the amount of force used must be proportional to the goal to be accomplished and to the mission. . . . The principle of proportionality is again an attempt to limit the violence, killing, and damage of war to only that which is directly related to the war and directly needed to accomplish the war objective--peace. It is a matter of justice."¹⁵⁷ These principles are used by several moral thinkers as the basis against nuclear weapons. The bishops held that nuclear weapons are destructive, indiscriminate and out of proportion to most war objectives.¹⁵⁸

Nuclear pacifists claim the use of nuclear weapons would be so destructive that it would likely violate Just War requirements. Moreover, "Christian nuclear pacifists also object to limited and discriminate nuclear capabilities, as would appear to be required by Just War considerations, because they believe such capabilities would 'destabilize'

¹⁵⁶ Ginder and Hicks, "On Peace and War," 33.

¹⁵⁷ Ginder and Hicks, "On Peace and War," 34.

¹⁵⁸ The Challenge of Peace, 101-110. Ginder and Hicks, "On Peace and War," 32-35.

deterrence."¹⁵⁹

The position of Christian nuclear pacifists is incoherent, for at least three reasons.

First, there is no reason to place all potential forms of nuclear use in a special unjust category. Some very limited and controlled forms of nuclear use could or in principle, help protect the innocent from an aggressive invasion Second, if we were to judge the use of force by the United States as unjust . . . then the United States would truly be unable to use any means to protect its civilians from aggression. Third, it is not consistent with a Christian understanding of moral responsibility to suggest that the United States, if it attempts to use force justly, would then be morally responsible for the possible subsequent unjust use of force by the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁰

Nuclear warfare nevertheless provides a new challenge to the just-war teaching and nonviolence principles. This is the "starting point of any further moral reflection: nuclear weapons particularly and nuclear warfare as it is planned today, raise new moral questions."¹⁶¹

Living in the nuclear age means that the world must condemn nuclear war, but still be able to live with nuclear weapons. The just-war theory has evolved, as an effort to prevent war; if war cannot be avoided, the theory of just-war then seeks to restrict and reduce its horrors. The theory

¹⁵⁹ Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and Just War Theory," 83.

¹⁶⁰ Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and Just War Theory," 86.

¹⁶¹ Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and Just War Theory," 122.

accomplishes this by establishing a set of rigorous conditions which must be met if the decision to go to war is to be morally permissible.¹⁶²

The U.S. strategy is to respond to aggression by a counterattack equal to the intensity appropriate to "terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the forces of freedom, and reestablish deterrence at the lowest possible level of violence, thus avoiding further destruction." In the bishops' consideration of limited nuclear war, their concern is not so much with the principles of proportionality or discrimination but with the uncontrolled escalation of nuclear war. They fear that "the use of one tactical weapon could produce panic, with completely unpredictable consequences." They consider the risk of uncontrolled escalation too great to justify any limited use of nuclear weapons, and they place the burden on those who disagree by stating: "the burden of proof remains on those who insist that meaningful limitation is possible."¹⁶³

It is difficult to examine the implications of the bishops' concern about uncontrolled escalation because they fail to state what they consider a morally acceptable standard of escalation control. Since uncontrollable escalation is likely to cause disproportionate casualties, it would be immoral to risk uncontrollable escalation because the risk of

¹⁶² Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and Just War Theory," 83.

¹⁶³ Foreman, "A Just War In The Nuclear Age," 9.

disproportionate casualties is likely to outweigh any military advantage. In order to determine when a limited nuclear response is morally permissible, one must first determine the certainty of control required of an authorizing official. Two standards of certainty are possible: reasonable probability and moral certainty.¹⁶⁴

During any discussion of the moral issue surrounding nuclear weapons, a fundamental principle recited in the preliminary passages of the pastoral letter must not be overlooked: "The Christian has no choice but to defend peace, properly understood, against aggression. This is an inalienable obligation."¹⁶⁵

Escalation is likely to occur, once nuclear force is employed, "the results being disproportionate and morally unacceptable destruction."¹⁶⁶ "It can be concluded from the previous discussion of technology that nuclear weapons are becoming increasingly similar to conventional weapons in that they could, but. . . need not violate the Just War guidelines of proportionality and discrimination."¹⁶⁷

"If the just use of force is to be considered unjust because of the potential indiscriminate destruction that an

¹⁶⁴ Foreman, "A Just War In The Nuclear Age," 10.

¹⁶⁵ The Challenge of Peace, 73.

¹⁶⁶ Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and Just War Theory," 78.

¹⁶⁷ Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and Just War Theory," 81.

aggressor might inflict, or response then it is not only the use of nuclear force that the United States must reject, but . . . the use of any force."¹⁶⁸ The U.S. Catholic bishops "do not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear war, on however restricted a scale, can be morally justified."¹⁶⁹

D. SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT

Woodrow Wilson made the following statement:

A democracy is peace-loving. It does not like to go to war. It is slow to rise to provocation. When it has once been provoked to the point where it must grasp the sword, it does not easily forgive it's adversary for having produced this situation. The fact of the provocation then becomes itself the issue. Democracy fights in anger--it fights for the very reason that it was forced to go to war. It fights to punish the power that was rash enough and hostile enough to provoke it--to teach that power a lesson it will not forget, to prevent the thing from happening again. Such a war must be carried to the bitter end.¹⁷⁰

In this statement President Wilson summed up the three schools that this thesis is examining.

First, "a democracy is peace-loving", here one can identify the school of "idealism." The core of idealism is to maintain peace, and bring peace to the world. The spreading

¹⁶⁸ Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and Just War Theory," 85.

¹⁶⁹ The Challenge of Peace, vii.

¹⁷⁰ George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: Expanded Edition, (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984), 65-66.

of democracy occurs within the scope of this school. Furthermore, the ideal of peace and democracy lie within the realm of America's moral values.

Next in Wilson's statement, are three sentences that refers to going to war. Within these three sentences one can identify the school of "isolationism." The isolatist does not like to fight, unless it is for the protection of his own borders. He seeks to maintain an absence from war and other foreign entanglements.

The final portion of his statement deals with war and what happens when America is push beyoud their moral beliefs of fighting. It is in this portion of the statement that one can clearly see the school of "realism." Realism deals with showing America's power and stopping the power of others. The realist seeks victory at all costs. He tends to slip away from his moral convictions for a period of time in order to achieve total victory and show his mighty power.

Every political act or decision involves some sort of moral responsibility. This is why America must strive for exemplary moral character. America must be aware of the impact on her moral character for the political action taken.¹⁷¹

America as a nation needs to find the proper way to honestly confront the moral consequences of national actions.

¹⁷¹ Theodore R. Weber, "Morality and National Power in International Politics," The Review of Politics, 26, 1, (January 1964), 40.

Americans also need to completely turn themselves from the thinking and the policy that has degraded the nation's moral posture. America must recognize that out of conviction and self-examination can come a genuine rebirth of the ideas America holds as a people.

As President Reagan declared: "When we speak of peace, we should not mean just the absence of war. The peace rests on pillars of freedom, human rights, national self-determination and respect for the rule of law."¹⁷²

The next chapter examines one aspect of what President Reagan was attempting to say, and that aspect is universal human rights. It attempts to examine the impact of human rights and relates human rights to American foreign policy.

¹⁷² Loebel, "Moral Values and U.S. Policy," 28.

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The term human rights was introduced to Americans in the twentieth century, but the idea of human rights in American foreign policy has been with America from the beginning. It's origin dates to the Declaration of Independence. America's Declaration of Independence reads, "We hold these truths to be self evident: that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. . . . To protect these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."¹⁷³

One reason America endorses equal rights stems from the very diversity of the United States. Thus Americans do not share a common history, race, language, or religion. Thus "rights" became the very definition of America.¹⁷⁴

"America did not invent human rights. In a very real sense it is the other way around. Human rights invented America. America was the first nation in the history of the

¹⁷³ Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Human Rights and the Foundations of Democracy," World Affairs, 144, 3, (Winter 1981-82), 196. She read this statement from the Declaration of Independence, as she addressed the United Nations.

¹⁷⁴ Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: A Symposium," Commentary, 72, 5, (November 1981), 42.

world to be founded explicitly on such an idea."¹⁷⁵

Based on the American creed, "human rights is a political idea with moral foundations."¹⁷⁶ It suggests that all humankind should be guaranteed certain basic rights, and that governments are responsible to deliver those rights.

Since the turn of this century, human rights issues have been promoted in American foreign policy on almost every political platform. It is politics that generated the movement of human rights and made it the powerful force in the world that it is today.¹⁷⁷

Thus President Wilson saw the League of Nations, as central in promoting a new ideal of human rights or equality for all. As Wilson stated in referring to Germany at the end of World War I: "We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world . . . instead of a place of mastery. . . . It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak."¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 743.

¹⁷⁶ Louis Henkin, "The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights," in Richard D. Lambert, ed, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 506, (November 1989), 11.

¹⁷⁷ Aryeh Neier, "Human Rights and Politics: A Matter of Principle," Nation, 252, 15, (April 22, 1991), 519.

¹⁷⁸ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 398.

Although the League ultimately failed, thirty years later, Franklin D. Roosevelt's idea of the United Nations was closely connected to his vision of Wilson's human rights. Franklin D. Roosevelt stated that "freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere." He went on to say that Americans "are inspired by a faith which goes back through all the years to the first chapter of the Book of Genesis: 'God created man in His own image.' We are . . . to uphold the doctrine that all men are equal in the sight of God."¹⁷⁹

This vision was carried forth by President Truman. Truman stated the following in favor of the United Nations.

To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.¹⁸⁰

One reason the United Nations was established was to

¹⁷⁹ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 512 and 518. (Emphasis added).

¹⁸⁰ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 540.

promote and encourage respect for human rights everywhere.¹⁸¹ The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights "consists of a Preamble and thirty articles, setting forth the human rights and fundamental freedoms to which all men and women, everywhere in the world, are entitled, without any discrimination."¹⁸² The following is a brief outline as described by Kirkpatrick.

Article 1, reads: 'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.' Article 2, which sets out the basic principle of equality and nondiscrimination as regards the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, forbids 'distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sect, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.' Article 3, a cornerstone of the Declaration, proclaims the right to life, liberty, and security of person. It introduces the series of articles (4-21) in which the human rights of every individual are elaborated further. Article 22, the second cornerstone of the Declaration, introduces Articles 23 to 27, in which economic, social, and cultural rights. The concluding articles, Articles 28 to 30, stress that everyone 'is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.'¹⁸³

Americans must remember that this charter is only as good as

¹⁸¹ Louis Henkin, "Law and Politics in International Relations: State and Human Values," Journal of International Affairs, 44, 1, (Spring 1990), 194.

¹⁸² Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Establishing a Viable Human Rights Policy," World Affairs, 143, 4, (Spring 1981), 330.

¹⁸³ Kirkpatrick, "Establishing a Viable Human Rights Policy," 330-331.

people of the world are willing to follow it. The charter by itself is of limited support, it takes governments willing to support it to make it happen.¹⁸⁴

Dwight D. Eisenhower had enough foresight in the heart of the Cold War to realize that America's greatest achievement was to maintain peace among the nations of the world. His hope was ". . . to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people and among nations. . . . (and that) all people will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love."¹⁸⁵

John F. Kennedy brought a new kind of style and imagination to the presidency. At different times Kennedy could represent both the realism and idealism schools of thought. He was filled with ideals and morals for America. In his inaugural address, he made his famous challenge to ". . . my fellow Americans; ask not what your country can do for you--ask what you can do for your country. My fellow citizens of the world; ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man. . . . With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on

¹⁸⁴ David P. Forsythe, "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," Political Science Quarterly, 105, 3, (Fall 1990), 436.

¹⁸⁵ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 594-596.

earth God's work must truly be our own."¹⁸⁶

In this century, human rights have played a major role in shaping American foreign policy, and more so since World War II.¹⁸⁷ For example Wilson's attempt of the League of Nations, the establishment of the United Nations, and the central place of human rights in the foreign policy of President Carter. "The real dialectic behind American foreign policy has always been our passion for human rights as universally desirable and our passion to protect the material fruits of our specifically American experience."¹⁸⁸

Although the phenomenon of human rights is not new to America, the emphasis given to human rights since the mid-1970s is new.¹⁸⁹ During the Carter Administration, human rights policy was defined by Cyrus Vance as: "1) the right to be free from government violation of the integrity of the person. . . . 2) the right to fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care and education. . . . 3) the

¹⁸⁶ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 605.

¹⁸⁷ Paula J. Dobriansky, "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy," The Washington Quarterly, 12, 2, (Spring 1989), 156.

¹⁸⁸ Elizabeth Petersen Spiro, "A Paradigm Shift in American Foreign Policy," Worldview, 20, (January/February 1977), 45.

¹⁸⁹ Dobriansky, "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy," 153.

right to enjoy political and civil liberties. . . ."190 Schlesinger wrote that the Declaration of Independence was founded on the proclamation of "inalienable" rights, and ever since human rights have been part of the "American tradition."191

It has been said that human rights issues are "possibly the most tangled web in American foreign policy."192 As a result "there is no simple or enduring domestic consensus behind concern for human rights in U.S. foreign policy. . . ."193 While human rights may be a "tangled web," it appears from the above that there is indeed an "enduring domestic consensus behind" the human rights issues. During this century, virtually every president has tried to establish a workable human rights policy. As stated with clarity in 1974, a principal goal of American foreign policy, "is to promote

¹⁹⁰ Law Day Address by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, University of Georgia, April 30, 1977, cited in "Toward an Integrated Human Rights Policy," monograph (New York: American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, 1979), 1, as cited by Dobriansky in "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy," 157.

¹⁹¹ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Human Rights and the American Tradition," Foreign Affairs, 57, (1978), 503-526, as cited by Forsythe, "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy," 435.

¹⁹² Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), 187, as cited by Forsythe in "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy," 450.

¹⁹³ Sandra Vogelgesang, American Dream, Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy, (New York: Norton, 1980), 111-112, as cited by Forsythe in "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy," 450.

the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights."¹⁹⁴

In retrospect, concerning Carter's human rights policy, "it is evident that the advocates of placing human rights at the center of America's foreign policy gave little consideration to the utility of any specific foreign policy instruments No better cornerstone for a foreign policy edifice constructed on a foundation of moral absolutes could be found. Human rights had the advantage of looking like a positive goal, without the negative connotations associated with the Cold War containment consensus."¹⁹⁵

In 1976, Henry Kissinger made it clear that any violations of human rights by a government might be cause for America to stop providing aid to that nation. Unless it was "determined that a 'extraordinary circumstances' [existed] to warrant a continuation."¹⁹⁶

Samuel Huntington holds that other nations have a very positive attitude toward America because of the conscious choices of presidents such as Kennedy and Carter. They both set a very high priority on the promotion of democracy and

¹⁹⁴ Sec. 502B(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, as cited by Aryeh Neier, "Human Rights in The Reagan Era: Acceptance in Principle," in Richard D. Lambert, ed, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 506, (November 1989), 31.

¹⁹⁵ Miller, "Morality in Foreign Policy," 147.

¹⁹⁶ Spiro, "A Paradigm Shift in American Foreign Policy," 42-43.

human rights with the world agenda.¹⁹⁷

Today, human rights are a central part of President Bush's New World Order. As Bush states, "what makes us American is our allegiance to an idea that all people everywhere must be free. This idea is as old and enduring as this nation itself. . . ."¹⁹⁸

Secretary of State James Baker has said: "I think . . . human rights . . . is one of the very basic foundations of our foreign policy, and for that matter, our national security policy I don't think that we should distinguish in our human-rights standards in application between situations where human rights are violated on the left or situations where human rights are violated on the right. I think our standards ought to be straight and we ought to play it down the middle."¹⁹⁹

Thus, human rights issues are "alive and active" in current American foreign policy.²⁰⁰ Several reasons have been offered for the continual vitality of human rights: First, ". . . human rights had become a major issue on the global

¹⁹⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, "American Ideals versus American Institutions," Political Science Quarterly, 97, 1, (Spring 1982), 31.

¹⁹⁸ Bush, "The Possibility of a New World Order," 452.

¹⁹⁹ Neier, "Human Rights in the Reagan Era," 31.

²⁰⁰ Jerome J. Shestack, "Human Rights, The National Interest, and U.S. Foreign Policy," The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 506, (November 1989), 18.

agenda, Second, furtherance of human rights served our security interests. . . . Third, human rights would further a just world order. . . . Fourth, . . . there were good reasons for a strong human rights focus in foreign policy. . . . Finally, it was in our national interest to have a foreign policy that commanded popular support because such a foreign policy would reflect fundamental values of the American people."²⁰¹

SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT

In the post Cold War world, human rights is bound to play a major role in American foreign policy. Jeane Kirkpatrick stated that ". . . not only should human rights play a central role in U.S. foreign policy, no U.S. foreign policy can possibly succeed that does not accord them a central role."²⁰²

Another policy writer stated that ". . . concern for human rights can and should be a component of American foreign policy. . . . If we are to advance the cause of human rights, a balance must be struck. While we must continue to speak the truth about every country which violates human rights, we must recognize that our influence is limited. The ultimate guarantors of human rights are the people of a given nation. Our role must be to make them understand that the United

²⁰¹ Shestack, "Human Rights, the National Interest, and U.S. Foreign Policy," 20-21.

²⁰² Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: A Symposium," 42.

States is on their side."²⁰³

President Carter sought to lay a very strong foundation in human rights policies around the world. He believed that a foreign policy based on fundamental values could use power and influence for humane purposes. Carter "reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy. What draws us together, perhaps more than anything else is a belief in human freedom . . . Throughout the world today, there is a preoccupation with the subject of human freedom, human rights."²⁰⁴

Nevertheless, there are some policy-makers who feel "human rights is a confusing foreign policy."²⁰⁵ For example, member nations of the United Nations can not agree on standards of human rights within their individual countries. Some countries have a strong support for human rights and others still have a total disregard for their peoples rights.

The future of human rights in the world will depend largely upon their continued existence and support in American foreign policy.²⁰⁶ By continuing to represent the "American way of Life," and spreading democratic ideals America will be

²⁰³ Bayard Rustin, "Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: A Symposium," 63.

²⁰⁴ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 720-721.

²⁰⁵ Miller, "Morality in Foreign Policy," 148.

²⁰⁶ William Barrett, "Human Rights and American Foreign policy: A Symposium," 26.

able to exercise its power and demonstrate its total support for universal human rights. The current waves of democratization sweeping the Soviet Union/Russia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and parts of Asia and Africa are the visible fruits of America's long term support of human rights. Ultimately, the earlier consequences of "isolationism," coupled with the tools of "realism" are now yielding "idealism" core goals of democracy and liberty.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has examined several aspects of American foreign policy. Its basic theme has been that President Bush's New World Order reflects enduring currents in American foreign policy. These currents are reflected in the concerns expressed by three major schools of thought in American foreign policy: isolationism, realism and idealism.

During the twentieth century, America has been under constant change. America has seen two World Wars, two other major conflicts, the Korean War and Vietnam, and several other smaller conflicts since the turn of the century. But one thing has not changed, and that is the motto or foundation of this great nation, which is "We the People." As this thesis has attempted to examine several aspects of American foreign policy, that phrase, "We the People," has been an underlining theme. That phrase contains several key goals such as freedom, democracy, peace, strength, morality, and human rights. The following was once stated about the United States.

The United States is not a state like France, China, England, etc., and it would be a great tragedy if someday the United States became such a state. What is the difference? First of all, the United States is not a national state, but a multinational state. Second, the United States was founded by people who valued individual freedom more highly than their own country. And so the United States is primarily a state of freedom. And this is what is most important. Whole peoples from other countries can say, Our homeland is Germany, Russia, or whatever;

only Americans can say, My homeland is freedom.²⁰⁷

Chapter I of this thesis includes a partial segment of President Bush's New World Order speech. The last five paragraphs of that segment contains the central core and essence of this thesis. It states:

The new world order does not mean surrendering our national sovereignty or forfeiting our interests. It refers to new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and to achieve stability, to achieve prosperity and, above all, to achieve peace.

It springs from hopes for a world based on a shared commitment among nations large and small, to a set of principles that undergird our relations. *Peaceful settlements of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples.*

The new world order really is a tool for addressing a new world of possibilities. This order gains its mission and shape not just from shared interests, but from shared ideals. And the ideals that have spawned new freedoms throughout the world have received their boldest and clearest expression in our great country the United States. Never before have so many millions drawn hope from the American idea. And the reason is simple: Unlike any other nation in the world, as Americans, we enjoy profound and mysterious bonds of affection and idealism.

What makes us American is our allegiance to an idea that all people everywhere must be free. This idea is as old and enduring as this nation itself.

The new world facing us, is a wonderful world of discovery. A world devoted to unlocking the promise of freedom.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, The Dilemma of American Ideals and Institutions in Foreign Policy, (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1981), 15.

²⁰⁸ Bush, "The Possibility of a New World Order," 451-452. Italics added.

Within that speech one can examine the assumption of peace, democracy, morality, human rights, isolationism, realism and idealism. Bush's New World Order is not new, but contains enduring currents that have always been part of American foreign policy. The power behind the New World Order is in the American people.

In many ways President Carter's policy foreshadowed several of the points and principles contained in Bush's New World Order. Carter's policy consisted of the following concepts.

Our policy should be based on close cooperation with our allies and worldwide respect for human rights, a reduction in world armaments, and it must always reflect our own moral values. . . . It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy--a policy based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision. . . . Our policy must reflect our belief that the world can hope for more than simple survival and our belief that dignity and freedom are fundamental spiritual requirements. Our policy must shape an international system that will last longer than secret deals. . . . Our policy is based on an historical vision of America's role. Our policy is derived from a larger view of global change. Our policy is rooted in our moral values, which never change. Our policy is reinforced by our material wealth and by our military power. Our policy is designed to serve mankind. And it is a policy that I hope will make you proud to be Americans.²⁰⁹

In a real sense Carter's policy laid the foundation for Bush's New World Order. Carter had the right ideal for an American foreign policy, but the timing for him and America was wrong.

²⁰⁹ Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 718-723.

In today's world, especially with all the changes that have occurred in the last two years, Carter's policy would probably have succeeded better. In some ways, President Carter was ahead of his time. Without the correct timing a policy can not and will not work. American presidencies are made and broken by timing.

Americans are willing to change, providing that the timing for them is there. The concepts of the New World Order provide that opportunity of change. Now is the time for America to use its influence to reshape the future of the world.

Chapter II provided an assessment of the three schools of thought in American foreign policy. Now, as America begins a new phase of history, which school of thought will tend to dominate? All three schools of thought have had there moments in history. And all three schools will continue to influence America and America's policy-makers.

Chapter III examined the concept of morality and foreign policy. It also discussed the moral dilemma of nuclear strategy in foreign policy. Throughout this nation moral principles and ideals have been the driving force behind American foreign policy. Since "We the People," moral principles have shaped America and American foreign policy. Despite moments in America's history where it appeared that moral principles lapsed the broad sweep of American history reaffirms the power of America ideals.

Today, it is said that "America is in midst of a moral renewal." Americans are returning to fundamental values. Those values - the cornerstone of the national spirit - inevitably find expression in America's foreign policy.

George Shultz stated the following about America's interests.

The United States of America is not just an onlooker, We are participants and we are engaged. America is again in a position to have a major influence over the direction of events--and the traditional goals and values of the American people have not changed. We have a duty to help shape the trends, as they evolve, in accordance with our ideals and interests, to help construct a new pattern of international stability that will ensure peace, prosperity and freedom for coming generations.²¹⁰

As Shultz stated Americans have a "duty to shape the world." This thesis has tried to show that America must be the force behind the re-shaping process, it must take an active part or role in changing this world. One way that America will accomplish this is by setting high standards at home. Returning to America's roots, American renewal flows from its first principle--a nation built on "the right of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."

George Shultz further stated the following:

So, as we head toward the 21st century, it is time for the democracies to celebrate their system, their beliefs and their success. We face challenges, but

²¹⁰ Shultz, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," 705.

we are well poised to master them. Opinions are being revised about which system is the wave of the future. The free nations, if they maintain their unity and their faith in themselves, have the advantage--economically, technologically, morally. History is on freedom's side.²¹¹

Chapter IV examined human rights as it pertains to foreign policy. This issues brings one back to "the right of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." America did not always use the term human rights, but American political thought held all to be equal.

Americans have been echoing the words "Let freedom ring," for years. In today's world Americans may finally get a change to see this freedom come to pass. More nations around the world are becoming democratic. Americans are seeing communism die as democracy takes on a new life or rebirth.

In the last two years this aspect of freedom has been more profound than the past forty-five years. It has been evident with the break up of Eastern Europe, the break up of the Soviet power and the sweeping move to democracy around the world.

Finally, it is fitting to cite President Kennedy from his New Frontier speech in 1960:

Recall with me the words of Isaiah: 'They that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary.' As we face the coming challenge, we too, shall wait upon the Lord, and ask that He renew

²¹¹ Shultz, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," 721.

our strength. Then shall we be equal to the test.
Then we shall not be weary. And then we shall
prevail.²¹²

Now is America's time. The New World Order, though it may not
be "new" has come at the right time. With careful leadership
America will be at the forefront of the unfolding changes.

²¹² Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American Presidents, 603.

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